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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: DUE PRO­
CESS LIBERTY INTERESTS-Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prison overcrowding has increased in recent years 1 and it is un­
likely that the situation will be alleviated substantially in the near 
future. Consequently, prison administrators have devised means by 
which to cope with the problem of insufficient cell space for prison­
ers. Defense counsel have been confronted with prisoner claims of 
cruel and unusual punishment, as well as fourteenth amendment vi­
olations resulting from the means devised by prison administrators. 2 
Gibson v. Lynch,3 the subject of this note, illustrates one administra­
tive response to the problem of prison overcrowding. Frazier Gib­
son was placed in solitary confinement4 for a period of almost three 
months due to a shortage of cells in the general population area of 
Trenton State Prison.s He was not a disciplinary6 or risk prisoner,7 
nor was he in need of protectionS for his own well-being. 
I. As of March 31, 1978, out of 82 court orders concerning conditions of confine­
ment in federal and state correctional facilities, 26 involved the issue of overcrowding. 
NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, 3 AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 32 (1980). 
2. One method employed by prison administrators to cope with the overcrowding 
has been to double and triple-cell inmates within the prison. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 
452 U.S. 337 (1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 (S.D. Tex. 1980), mod!fted, 
650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981). 
3. 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981). 
4. Solitary confinement normally is utilized for prisoners who are under discipli­
nary sanction or who require protection. Id at 354. 
5. Id at 350. 
6. When an inmate is found guilty of committing a prohibited act, a deci­
sion is made ... as to the appropriate disciplinary action. The [sic] sanction 
imposed is selected after careful consideration of many factors which may in­
clude the inmate's past history offenses, his overall institutional adjustment and 
the circumstances surrounding the particular infraction. 
TRENTON STATE PRISON, INMATE HANDBOOK 31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INMATE 
HANDBOOK]. 
7. "Disciplinary detention is used ... where the inmate's presence in the general 
population poses a serious threat to person, property, orderly operations or the security 
of the institution." Id at 35. 
8. "Administrative segregation . . . is used for the protection, confinement or 
treatment of those who cannot safely participate in, or adjust to the ordinary routine of 
the institutional program until evidence is available to warrant return to the general pop­
ulation." Id at 38-39. 
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This note addresses the question of whether a prisoner's expec­
tation of the treatment that he will receive upon arrival at the prison 
is a protected liberty interest and whether this interest is violated 
when the prisoner is held under solitary conditions for administra­
tive convenience rather than for disciplinary or protective reasons. 
The first area discussed in this note is the eighth amendment's prohi­
bition against cruel and unusual punishment.9 Following this discus­
sion is an overview of Supreme Court decisions in which the nature 
of an individual's liberty interest formerly had been interpreted 
broadly but in recent years has been narrowed sharply. Finally, an 
individual's right to a hearing will be examined. 
II. GIBSON 
A. GibsonJ' Confinement 
Frazier Gibson was convicted in New Jersey state court for pos-: 
session of a stolen vehicle and sentenced to a minimum of three 
years and a maximum of five years imprisonment. 10 Gibson was sen­
tenced on December 16, 1976. 11 He was sent to the Essex County 
JaiP2 and was later transferred to the Classification Center at 
Yardville. I3 There, he was housed in an individual cell in the recep­
tion unit because he was an adult and Yardville's population was 
primarily youthful inmates. 14 While at Yardville, Gibson was not 
allowed to mingle with the general population, nor was he allowed 
access to the legal library, visitors, or to attend general worship serv­
ices. ls Denial of these privileges, however, was normal procedure l6 
9. The courts have failed to devise an overall standard to aid in determining 
whether a given situation rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ("prisoner must allege acts or omissions suffi­
ciently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (prohibits "excessive" punishment which involves "the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and is "grossly out of proportion to the sever­
ity of the crime"); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 370 (1st Cir. 1978) (nature and 
duration of new form of incarceration must not exceed original purpose); M.C.I. Con­
cord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398,404 (D. Mass. 1978) ("contemporary stan­
dards of decency"); State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 211, 276 A.2d 369, 373 (1971) ("clearly 
arbitrary and without rational relation to the offense or so disproportionate to the of­
fense"); State v. Fearick, 132 N.J. Super. 165, 170,333 A.2d 29,31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1975), qffd, 69 N.J. 32, 350 A.2d 227 (1976) ("neither shock the general conscience 
nor violate principles of fundamental fairness"). 
10. 652 F.2d at 350. 
11. Id 
12. Id 
13. Id This transfer occurred on January 25, 1977. Id 
14. Id 
15. Id 
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for handling inmates awaiting classification l7 and assignment to one 
of the adult prison populations. On February 8, 1977, Gibson was 
classified for Rahway State Prison, a medium security institution. IS 
Due to a shortage of cell space at Rahway, however, he was trans­
ferred to Trenton State Prison, a maximum security institution,19 
where he was considered a "housing hold."20 
Upon arrival at Trenton, Gibson was put directly into 10ck-up.21 
Normally, lock-up was used to discipline inmates who violated 
prison rules, to segregate inmates who were considered especially 
dangerous, or to protect the lives of those inmates threatened by 
other prisoners.22 In 1977, however, New Jersey had a serious 
shortage of cell space within its prison system.23 In addition, seventy 
prisoners had been transferred to Trenton from the minimum secur­
ity prison at Leesburg for their involvement in a disruption there.24 
Therefore, the solitary confinement cells were utilized to accommo­
date the additional prisoner population. 
Gibson's confinement at Trenton from March 4, 1977, until 
June 1, 1977, was in Seven Wing, which contained maximum secur­
ity isolation cells.25 His activities were restricted severely. He was 
16. "No group religious services are conducted for residents of the reception unit 
and they are not provided access to any law library, nor any recreational or educational 
library which may be available to the youthful inmates of the center." Brief on Behalf of 
Defendant-Appellant at 12a-13a, Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981) [hereinaf­
ter cited as Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant). 
17. The first two weeks of a prisoner's confinement is spent in the reception center 
at the Yardville facility where the prisoner undergoes a series of evaluations, examina­
tions, and interviews. Personnel at Yardville compile personal information on the pris­
oner along with any information received from the courts. When this process is 
completed, the prisoner appears before the Prison Complex Inter-Institutional Classifica­
tion Committee. This committee, which is made up of the superintendents, or their 
designates, of Trenton, Rahway, and Leesburg State Prisons makes the initial institution 
assignment. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 2. 
18. 652 F.2d at 350. 
19. Id 
20. Id 
21. Gibson was considered a "housing hold" because he was awaiting cell space at 
Rahway. Id Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 
(3d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee). 
22. 652 F.2d at 350. 
23. Id 
24. Id 
25. Id Gibson was confined in a cell that was five feet by seven feet by eight feet, 
with a solid wall on three sides and a metal gate on the front. The cell contained a steel 
bed, a toilet, and a sink with cold running water. Id Gibson described the toilet facili­
ties as "protruding from the back wall of the cell leading from a center trap area." Brief 
on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, supra note 18. As a result of this set-up, a stench 
from the toilets on the wing permeated the cell. Id 
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confined to this cell for twenty-three hours and fifty minutes a day. 
On six separate occasions, he was released for one hour of recrea­
tion.26 Gibson was not allowed to eat with the prisoners in general 
population and was required, instead, to eat all meals in his cell.27 
Gibson could shower for only ten minutes of each day.28 Other priv­
ileges were withheld completely: He had neither radio nor televi­
sion;29 was not allowed direct access to the legal library;30 was not 
allowed to attend movies;31 was not allowed contact visits;32 was not 
allowed to attend community worship services;33 and was not al­
lowed access to the recreationallibrary.34 In addition, Gibson was 
required to wear the same clothes from March 4, 1977, until May 5, 
1977.35 He was forced to launder his clothes in the cold water sink 
within his cell and he had no other clothes to wear while his laun­
dered clothing dried.36 
B. The Findings ofthe District Court 
On May 26, 1977 Gibson filed apro se complaint37 alleging that 
his confinement under solitary conditions, the result of New Jersey's 
lack of prison housing, violated his constitutional rights.38 Prior to a 
hearing on the merits of his claim, he was removed from solitary 
confinement.39 
On August 14, 1978 an attorney was appointed for Gibson40 and 
26. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, supra note 21. 
27. Id 
28. 652 F.2d at 350. 
29. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8, supra note 21. 







35. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8, supra note 21. His clothing consisted 
of one set of underwear, a pair of sneakers, a pair of socks, a khaki shirt and a pair of 
trousers. He was not issued any additional clothing nor was he able to obtain any laun­
dry service ;or these clothes. Id Included in the list of rights to which the prisoners at 
Trenton were entitled was "the right to health care which include[d). . . proper bedding 
and clothing, [and) a laundry schedule for cleanliness of same...." INMATE HAND­
BOOK, supra note 6, at 16. 
36. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff~Appellee at 8, supra note 21. 
37. Id at 3; Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 2, supra note 16. The com­
plaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) in the Federal District Court in Newark, 
New Jersey seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. 
38. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 5a, supra note 16. 
39. 652 F.2d at 349. 
40. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of 
Defendant-Appellant at 2, supra note 16. 
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on October 2, 1978 an amended complaint was filed.41 The com­
plaint deleted the claim for injunctive relief, added Superintendent 
Lynch of Yardville and Commissioner Fauver of the Department of 
Correction as defendants, and sought damages for Gibson's confine­
ment in Yardville and Trenton.42 
On March 5 and 6, 1979, pursuant to a May 2, 1978 order of the 
district court,43 an evidentiary hearing was held before a United 
States Magistrate.44 On May 25, 1979, the magistrate filed with the 
court a report and recommendation45 that judgment in the sum of 
eight-hundred dollars be entered against defendants Hilton and 
Fauver with costs and attorneys fees to be fixed.46 The magistrate 
further recommended that judgment be entered in favor of defend­
ant Lynch.47 On June 21, 1979, the magistrate reversed48 her judg­
ment against Fauver since it had been determined that he had not 
been the Commissioner of Corrections at the time of Gibson's im­
prisonment.49 On January 29, 1980, an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey adopting the magis­
trate's recommendations was entered. 50 
The district court endorsed the magistrate's finding that Gibson 
had a state created expectation of liberty under the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 51 The court found that such an 
41. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant, at 8a-Ila, supra note 16. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 7a. 
44. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of 
Defendant-Appellant at 37a, supra note 16. 
45. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 12a-31a, supra note 16. 
46. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of 
Defendant-Appellant at 2-3, supra note 16. 
47. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of 
Defendant-Appellant at 3, supra note 16. 
48. The magistrate's amended findings, conclusion and recommendation reaf­
firmed the previous report and recommendation except for the judgment against Fauver. 
Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 36a, supra note 16. 
49. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of 
Defendant-Appellant at 3, supra note 16. 
50. 652 F.2d at 349. Judgment in the sum of $800 was entered in favor of Gibson 
against the defendant Hilton. Also, judgment was entered against Gibson in favor of the 
defendants Lynch and Fauver. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 37a-38a, 
supra note 16. On March 17, 1980 the magistrate filed another report and recommenda­
tion stating that Gibson be awarded $5,497.50 as attorneys' fees together with costs of 
$303.75. Id. at 39a-44a. On April 17, 1980, the district court filed an order adopting the 
report of the magistrate and judgment was entered accordingly. Id. at 45a-46a. 
51. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 27a, supra note 16. The fourteenth 
amendment provides in part that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
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expectation had been violated on the basis of his solitary confine­
ment at Trenton State Prison and that defendant Hilton was not en­
titled to the defense of immunity.52 The court found that no steps 
had been taken to remedy Gibson's situatio"n, although prison offi­
cials were aware of the conditions and other inmates had been re­
turned to general population. 53 The district court rejected Gibson's 
claim that his confinement at both Yardville and Trenton violated 
eighth amendment standards and also rejected his claims of due pro­
cess violations at Yardville. 54 
Defendant Hilton filed a motion of appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on April 28, 1980.55 The 
Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the conditions under 
which Gibson lived during this period did not violate the eighth 
amendment.56 The Third Circuit did not agree, however, that Gib­
son's confinement violated his fourteenth amendment right to due 
process and reversed the district court's orders awarding damages, 
costs, and attorneys' fees to Gibson.57 
II. 	 THE PARAMETERS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT­
ARE THERE GUIDELINES? 
The New Jersey Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail 
shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel 
and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted."58 This is virtually 
identical to the eighth amendment of the United States 
Constitution.59 
The New Jersey Superior Court has defined punishment to be 
cruel and unusual if the nature of the punishment shocks the general 
conscience or violates principles of fundamental fairness.6o The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that it "will not interfere 
with the prescribed form of penalty unless it is so clearly arbitrary 
and without rational relation to the offense or so disproportionate to 
52. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellart at 37a-38a, supra note 16. 
53. Id. 
54. 652 F.2d at 350. 
55. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 47a, supra note 16. 
56. 652 F.2d at 351. 
57. Id. at 349-50. 
58. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
59. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments indicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
60. State v. Fearick, 132 N.J. Super. 165, 170,333 A.2d 29, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.1975), aJl'd, 69 N.J. 32, 350 A.2d 227 (1976). 
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the offense as to transgress the Federal and State [constitu­
tions]...."61 In addition, there should be no judicial interference 
"either as to the classification of offenders selected for separate treat­
ment or as to the penalty prescribed for them, unless it is clearly 
constitutionally indefensible. "62 
At least one Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 
has written on the subject. Justice Brennan indicated that the test of 
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual involves several factors, 
including whether the "punishment is unusually severe, [whether] 
there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, [whether] 
. . . it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and 
[whether] there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal pur­
pose more effectively than some less severe punishment. ..."63 
Against this background, the Third Circuit began its discussion 
of whether Gibson's confinement constituted cruel and unusual pun­
ishment by noting that as a convicted and sentenced prisoner, Gib­
son could not claim the right to be free from punishment. 64 He 
could only claim the right to be free from excessive punishment "so 
totally without penological justification that it result[ed] in the gratu­
itous infliction of suffering."65 The court then noted that the condi­
tions of Gibson's confinement satisfied his basic needs for nutrition 
and shelter.66 
The court of appeals noted that the district court, in adopting 
the magistrate's recommendation, had aiso concluded that Gibson's 
nutritional needs were met while he was at Trenton.67 Acknowledg­
ing that his living and hygienic accommodations were spartan, the 
district court concluded that they were not injurious to a person in 
reasonable physical and mental health.68 His medical needs were 
met and he was not callously denied medical attention.69 Gibson, 
however, testified that he received less than adequate medical atten­
tion and that he was never given a medical examination to investi­
gate his complaint of stomach problems.70 The Third Circuit's 
61. State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 211, 276 A.2d 369, 373 (1971). 
62. Id, 276 A.2d at 374. 
63. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
64. 652 F.2d at 352. 
65. Id (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976». 
66. 652 F.2d at 352. 
67. Id 
68. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 20a-2Ia, supra note 16. 
69. Id at 21a. 
70. Trial Transcript at 38-39, 70-71, Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Trial Transcript). Rather, he was given an array of medication in an 
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conclusion that adequate attention was given to Gibson's "nutri­
tional and other needs,"71 however, ignored the fact that Gibson was 
required to wear the same set of clothing for two months. In addi­
tion, all of his meals had to be taken in the cell, which was perme­
ated with the smell of human waste from outdated toilet facilities 
protruding from the back wall of the cell.72 
The question raised by Gibson's confinement was whether his 
treatment was without penological justification, thereby making it 
excessive punishment. In an earlier decision, Hodges v. Klein,73 the 
District Court of New Jersey held that "segregated confinement does 
not in itself constitute cruel and unusual punishment. ..."74 
Hodges was a constitutional challenge to the creation and mainte­
nance of a special unit known as the Management Control Unit 
(MCU) at Trenton State Prison. Several months of unrest at Tren­
ton resulted in an administrative decision that a close custody unit 
was necessary. Under this plan, inmates in the general population 
who required more stringent security measures were segregated from 
others and their movements were restricted.75 Wing officers were in­
structed to compile lists of those inmates whom they believed needed 
closer scrutiny.76 One week after the inmates were moved from gen­
eral population to the MCU, they were given written notice that the 
MCU had been created and a Special Classification Committee 
(SCC) had been established. The notice stated that the SCC would 
begin hearings to determine which inmates should remain in the 
MCU.77 Approximately eighty inmates ultimately were designated 
to remain and about forty inmates were designated for return to gen­
eral population. The returning inmates were not moved immedi­
ately because space was not available in general population to 
accommodate them.78 
Violence erupted in the MCU following an escape attempt in 
which one inmate died and a prison guard was severely injured.79 
effort to find one that would alleviate the problem. He refused to take some of the medi­
cation he was given because the medical assistant was treating him based on a descrip­
tion of his symptoms which had been conveyed by word of mouth rather than from 
information acquired during a medical consultation or a physical examination. Id. 
71. 652 F.2d at 352. 
72. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, supra note 21. 
73. 421 F. Supp. 1224 (D.N.J. 1976), aJl'd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977). 
74. Id. at 1236. 
75. Id. at 1229. 
76. Id. at 1229-30. 
77. Id. at 1230. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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Inmates were transferred to lower tiers of Seven Wing and placed in 
empty cells. In some cases inmates had no clothes; the cells had no 
mattresses and there was no running water in the sinks or toilets.80 
Although these transfers were made without prior notice and hear­
ing, the court concluded that an inmate could be subjected to more 
restrictive confinement without prior notice and hearing when exi­
gent circumstances warranted.81 
The Hodges court noted that the purpose of twenty-four hour 
lock-up segregation was to confine inmates who had displayed spe­
cific and recurring violent destructive behavior.82 Along these lines 
even nonviolent and nondestructive inmates who disrupted the or­
derly and peaceful operation of the prison could be segregated.83 
The court could not, however, understand the need to keep nonvio­
lent inmates under twenty-four hour lock-up conditions because any 
threat they may have presented existed only when they circulated in 
general population.84 
Confusion about the need to impose such extreme lock-up con­
ditions is equally applicable to Gibson. The Third Circuit specifi­
cally stated that "Gibson was not a disciplinary problem, was not in 
need of protective custody and was not uncontrollable or suffering 
from any serious maladjustment requiring administrative segrega­
tion."8s Gibson had not displayed any characteristics that would 
trigger administrative concern, yet he was kept locked up for twenty­
three hours and fifty minutes per day and was deprived of all privi­
leges for three months. Unfortunately, the Hodges court merely 
questioned the necessity for keeping disorderly prisoners under 
twenty-four hour lock-up conditions. The court stated that its own 
views were irrelevant because a federal court could not command 
state officials to disregard a policy that the state had decided was 
suitable merely because the federal court believed the policy was un­
sound or personally repugnant. 86 
The deference given by a court to prison administrators in the 
determination of whether certain treatment is cruel and unusual is 
very broad. The only criterion seems to be whether administrators 
decide that lock-up policy is suitable. Although individual punitive 
80. Id at 1230-31. 
81. Id at 1231. 
82. Id at 1237. 
83. Id 
84. Id 
85. 652 F.2d at 355. 
86. 421 F. Supp. at 1237. 
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administrativ~ decisions may not rise to the level of cruel and unu­
sual punishment, the cumulative effect of these decisions may rise to 
that level. There remains the issue of drawing the line to distinguish 
between situations in which courts will intervene when a policy, suit­
able to prison administrators, appears unsound or repugnant to the 
court, and those situations in which the court will defer to the prison 
administrator's judgment. 
A Justice on the Supreme Court has addressed this question. In 
his concurring opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman,87 Justice Blackmun 
feared that the courts had adopted a policy of general deference to 
prison administrators and state legislatures.88 He believed that fed­
eral courts should be available for those state inmates who made 
claims of eighth amendment violations.89 Incarceration entailed re­
strictions and a loss of privileges but it was not "an open door for 
unconstitutional cruelty or neglect."90 
Rhodes marked the first time the United States Supreme Court 
considered the limitation that the eighth amendment imposes upon 
the conditions under which a state may confine convicted 
criminals.91 The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) began 
receiving inmates in late 1972. Prison administrators began double 
celling inmates in 1975 due to an increase in Ohio's state-wide prison 
population.92 The cells were modern.93 Adjacent to the cell blocks 
were "day rooms,"94 open to inmates between 6:30 a.m. and 9:30 
87. 452 U.s. 337 (1981). 
88. Id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. The eighth amendment was made applicable to the states through the four­
teenth amendment in both Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Louisiana ex 
rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
92. 452 U.S. at 341. 
93. Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. Each con­
tains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-type night stand, a wall­
mounted sink with hot and cold running water, and a toilet diat the inmate can 
flush from inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered bunk 
bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent near the ceiling, and 960 
of the cells have a window that inmates can open and close. All of the cells 
have a cabinet, shelf, and radio built into one ofthe walls, and in all of the cells 
one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can be seen. 
Id. at 341. 
94. According to the district court, "[tJhe day rooms are in a sense part of the cells 
and they are designed to furnish that type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary 
citizen would seek in his living room or den." Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 434 F. 
Supp. 1007, 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1977). Each day room contains a wall-mounted television, 
card tables, and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the day rooms during a 
IO-minute period each hour, on the hour, when the doors to the day rooms and cells are 
opened. Id. 
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p.m. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 inmates, sixty-seven 
percent serving life or other long-termed sentences.95 About 1,400 
inmates were double celled, of which approximately seventy-five 
percent had the opportunity to spend most of their waking hours in 
the day rooms, schools, workshops, library, visitation areas, at meals, 
or in the showers.96 
The district court concluded that double ceiling was cruel and 
unusual punishment.97 The Supreme Court disagreed and stated 
that the findings of fact did not support the district court's conclu­
sion.98 The Court concluded that the Constitution does not mandate 
comfortable prisons and that prisons like SOCF, which house per­
sons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort.99 
This conclusion indicates that eighth amendment violations rarely 
will be found and portends far reaching effects. The Court chose to 
use prisoners' overall characteristics as a standard for determining 
conditions of confinement, meaning the more serious the offense, the 
less comfortable the prison may be. 
The Rhodes Court noted that it could not be assumed that state 
legislatures and prison officials were insensitive to the requirements 
of the Constitution or to the sociological problems involved with try­
ing to achieve the goals of the criminal justice system. lOO Recent 
Supreme Court decisions have emphasized that deference should be 
given to the informed discretion of prison officials,101 although this 
notion has been tempered by the view that "prison administrators 
95. fd 
96. Id 
97. 434 F. Supp. at 1020. The district court rested its conclusion on five considera­
tions: inmates were serving long terms of imprisonment which accentuated the problems 
of close confinement and overcrowding; housing 38 percent more inmates than design 
capacity necessarily involved excess limitation of general movement as well as physical 
and mental injury from long exposure; studies had recommended each person in an insti­
tution have at least 50 to 55 square feet of living quarters; at best a prisoner who was 
double celled would spend most of his time in the cell with his cellmate; and SOCF had 
made double celling a practice, therefore it was not a temporary condition. Id at 1020­
21. 
98. 452 U.S. at 347. There was no evidence that double celling under the circum­
stances in Rhodes either infiicted unnecessary or wanton pain or was grossly dispropor­
tionate to the severity of the crimes. 
99. Id at 349. 
100. Id at 352. These goals are ''to punish justly, to deter future crime, and to 
return imprisoned persons to society with an improved chance of being usefullaw-abid­
ing citizens." Id 
101. "The necessary and correct result of our deference to the informed discretion 
ofprison administrators permits them, and not the courts, to make the difficult judgments 
concerning institutional operations ...." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 
433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977). "[I]n the absence of substantial evidence ... to indicate that 
258 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:247 
may be 'experts' only by Act of Congress or of a state legislature." 102 
If the courts blindly defer to the legislature and the legislature defers 
to prison administrators, the end result may be that prisons will be 
run by persons who are accountable to no one. The Court did not 
define a "comfortable" prison, nor did the Court indicate the degree 
of discomfort that would be allowed before an eighth amendment 
violation was found. Any court's interpretation of the severity of an 
offense, and the accompanying conditions of confinement, carries 
with it a certain degree of subjectivity. Lack of a definitive standard 
coupled with subjective evaluations of conditions ultimately will 
lead to inconsistent determinations and will leave no foundation 
upon which to base a claim of an eighth amendment violation. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rhodes, believed that as a result 
of the rising crime rate of recent years, there was an alarming ten­
dency toward a simplistic penological philosophy: if we lock the 
prison doors and throwaway the keys, our streets will somehow be 
safe.103 If an irrebuttable presumption were created that prison ad­
ministrators are sensitive to constitutional requirements, and wide­
ranging deference 104 is given to implement their policies, in the fu­
ture, it is likely that much of what occurs in the prisons will not be 
known to anyone except those inside. This confidence in the sensi­
tivity of legislatures and prison administrators is misplaced. Evi­
dence of this misplaced confidence can be found in the repeated 
need for federal intervention to protect the rights of inmates. 105 In 
light of this wide-ranging judicial deference, the minimal attention 
given to Gibson's medical and hygienic needs, and the tenuous ra­
tionalization for Gibson's solitary confinement, it may be said that 
Gibson's confinement solely for reasons of administrative conven­
ience was excessive. 
the officials have exaggerated their response. . ., courts should ordinarily defer to their 
expert judgment in such matters." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). 
102. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979). 
103. Justice Marshall stated that, given the current state of affairs, it was "unrealis­
tic to expect legislators to care whether the prisons are overcrowded or harmful to inmate 
health." 452 U.S. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
104. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Court asserted that "[pJrison ad­
ministrators. . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execu­
tion of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order 
and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id. at 547. 
105. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (lengthy periods of punitive 
isolation); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (failure to treat inmate's medical needs); 
Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (severe overcrowding); Gates v. Collier, 
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (poor housing conditions); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th 
Cir. 1971) (unsafe conditions and inmate abuse). 
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Judicial decisions provide little guidance to assist in the deter­
mination of the bounds of cruel and unusual punishment. The deci­
sions contain such phrases as "shocks the general conscience" or 
"clearly arbitrary and without rational relation to the offense" but 
the courts have failed to apply these standards in any predictable 
fashion. 106 The courts have refused to interfere with decisions by 
prison administrators when the decisions are thought to be suitable 
and in response to exigent circumstances. 107 Indistinct standards 
and wide-ranging deference to prison administrators make clear that 
a violation of the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishment rarely will be found. Denial of an eighth 
amendment cause of action forces the prisoner to claim a due pro­
cess violation of the fourteenth amendment for relief. 
III. LIBERTY INTEREST IN THE PRISON SETTING 
Gibson argued that prisoners had a justifiable expectation that 
they would not remain in solitary confinement for twenty-three 
hours and fifty minutes a day for a period of three months unless 
minimal due process procedures were followed. lOB This expectation 
was created by the policies and practices of the New Jersey prison 
system. 109 The district court found that Gibson was denied certain 
106. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
107. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano,427 U.S. 215, 22S-29 (1976); Hluchan v. Fauver, 
4S0 F. Supp. 103, 10S-09 (D.N.J. 1979); Cobb v. Aytch, 472 F. Supp. 90S, 923 (E.D. Pa. 
1979), mod!fied, 643 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 19S1); Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224, 1237 
(D.N.J. 1976), affd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977). 
lOS. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 17, supra note 21. 
109. Id The district court concluded that no constitutional entitlement, sufficient 
to invoke due process, existed in a transfer to a less favorable institution without some 
state practice that conditioned transfers upon proof of misconduct. Brief on Behalf of 
Defendant-Appellant at 23a, supra note 16. The court looked to Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U.S. 215 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) for support for this propo­
sition. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text. The district court then looked to 
established prison policies and practices to determine whether they created some liberty 
interest requiring due process. The court concluded that administrative quarantine, Gib­
son's classification in the prison, was not different from the other classifications, thus 
expressing a policy that isolated confinement for any appreciable period was to be pre­
ceded by a hearing and subject to continuing review. Brief on Behalf of Defendant­
Appellant at 25a-26a, supra note 16. "The meticulous details governing assignment to 
isolated confinement reinforces the idea that isolation is an extreme circumstance, so 
drastically different from the usual prison experience as to be in fact a matter of substan­
tial importance to a prisoner." Id at 26a. The description of administrative quarantine 
is as follows: 
Be advised that effective immediately administrative quarantine 
at State Prison, Trenton is to be used for the specific housing of the 
following designated inmate personnel. 
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privileges which appeared to be guaranteed to all inmates not subject 
to disciplinary restrictions. 110 The court concluded that the express 
l. 	 Prison Reception Unit housing holds assigned by Inter-Institution 
Classification Committee for assignment to State Prison, Rahway 
or State Prison, Leesburg. 
2. 	 Pre-Hearing Detention (Management Control Unit) inmates who 
have been classified by the Special Classification Committee as 
general population and are referred back to the sending institution 
or to general population State Prison, Trenton pending space 
availability. 
3. 	 State Prison, Trenton inmate personnel who may be experiencing 
housing difficulties within the general population and re-assign­
ment to another housing wing or unit is not readily available. 
Placement in Administrative Quarrantine [sic] is also under the direct con­
trol of the Superintendent, Assistants to the Superintendent, Chief Deputy and 
the Area 1 and 2 Shift Captains. Under no circumstances are inmates to be 
placed in Administrative Quarrantine [sic] without the above authorities written 
and signed authorization to the Center Keepers. 
Inmates placed in Administrative Quarrantine [sic] are to be afforded the 
following sanctions: 
1. 	 Daily medical/dental and professional treatment staff 
services. 
2. 	 Regularly scheduled showers. 
3. 	 Current rules and policies govering [sic] the general pop­
ulation regarding reading-writing materials. Smoking in 
their cells-personal clothing-and weekly canteen 
services. 
4. 	 Inmates are entitled to window phone visits per institu­
tional policy. 
5. 	 Inmates are entitled to phone calls per institutional 
policy. 
6. 	 Inmates do not have contact visit rights while in Admin­
istrative Quarrantine [sic]. 
7. 	 Inmates do not have yard recreation rights while in Ad­
ministrative Quarrantine [sic]. 
8. 	 Inmates assigned to Administrative Quarrantine [sic] are 
not processed through the State Prison, Trenton Prison 
Classification Committee for custody or program 
assignments. 
The above listed sanctions are subject to review and change by the Super­
intendent's [sic] Office at any time. Due notice of any changes in the sanctions 
for administrative Quarrantine [sic] will be given to all parties directly responsi­
ble for the management and security of said Unit. 
Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 33a-35a, supra note 16. 
110. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 26a, supra note 16. The court enu­
merated the following: an adequate clothing supply to be issued shortly after admission; 
active and passive recreation including athletics, movies, reading and games; television in 
the auditorium twice weekly; daily active indoor or outdoor recreation even though con­
fined to reception or administrative segregation or a special treatment unit; a weekly 
movie; and two hours per week of exercise even though confined to administrative segre­
gation. Id "While none of the enumerated privileges individually rises to the substance 
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policies of the Department of Corrections I I I created a justifiable ex­
pectation that, without minimal due process procedures,112 Gibson 
would not be confined in isolation for three months under the condi­
tions found to have existed. l13 
The Third Circuit, however, rejected the district court's conclu­
sion and reversed its orders.114 Although the court acknowledged 
that Gibson's confinement was severe, it emphasized that his quar­
antine status was due to the shortage of cell space for the general 
prison population. I IS The court of appeals decided that it could not 
rely upon disciplinary cases nor upon cases concerning prisoner iso­
lation in special risk units and in protective custody because those 
cases had no bearing on Gibson's situation. I 16 The court stated that 
of a constitutionally protected right, all of them taken together appear to present a way of 
life which is guaranteed to New Jersey prisoners." Id 
Ill. The Trenton State Prison Inmate Handbook for 1977 set out the inmates' 
rights: 
You have the right to expect that as a human being you will be treated 
respectfully, impartially, and fairly by all personnel. 
You have the right to be informed of the rules, procedures, and schedules 
concerning the operations of the institution. 
You have the right to freedom of religious affiliation, and voluntary reli­
gious worship. 
You have the right to health care which includes nutritious meals, proper 
bedding and clothing, a laundry schedule for cleanliness of same, an opportu­
nity to shower regularly, proper ventilation for warmth and fresh air, a regular 
exercise period, toilet articles and medical and dental treatment. 
You have the right to correspond and visit with family members, friends 
and other persons where there is no threat to the security order or rehabilitation 
in keeping with the rules and schedules of the facility. 
You have the right to unrestricted and confidential access to the courts by 
correspondence (on matters such as the legality of your conviction, civil mat­
ters, pending criminal cases and to conditions of your confinement). 
You have the right to legal counsel from an attorney of your choice by 
interview and correspondence. 
You have the right to participate in the use of Law Library reference 
materials to assist you in resolving legal matters. You also have the right to 
receive help when it is available through a legal assistance program. 
You have the right to a wide range of reading material for educational 
purposes and for your own enjoyment. 
You have the right to participate in counseling, education, vocational 
training, and employment as far as resources are available and in keeping with 
your interest, needs and abilities. 
INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 16-17. 
112. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
lB. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 27a, supra note 16. 
114. 652 F.2d at 361. 
115. Id at 354. 
116. Id 
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such a housing crisis had not occurred prior to nor since this particu­
lar situation. 117 Because of this anomaly, Gibson's treatment was 
considered acceptable as a legitimate response to a situation that had 
taken prison administrators by surprise. I IS 
The dissent, however, failed to "see how overcrowding in the 
state system or the disturbance at Leesburg had any bearing on 
whether an inmate receive[d] clean laundry, access to educational 
and legal books. . . and regular showers with soap, hot water and a 
towel."119 The dissent also questioned why sixty-nine of the Lees­
burg inmates, transferred to Trenton State because of a disturbance 
at Leesburg, were given a hearing and reassignment within a month, 
while Gibson suffered for three months.120 
A. United States Supreme Court Liberty Interest Decisions 
Due to the distinction the Third Circuit found between Gibson 
and other prisoner isolation cases, the court applied the general prin­
ciples found in related Supreme Court cases. 121 The court examined 
three Supreme Court cases dealing with liberty interests. The first, 
Wo!!fv. McDonnel/ 122 recognized that a state may afford a prisoner a 
liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment. 123 The second two 
cases, Meachum v. Fano 124 and Montanye v. Haymes,125 rejected 
claims of prisoners seeking fourteenth amendment protection to pre­
vent transfer from one prison to another. 126 The three cases dis­
cussed by the court are part of a long line of cases in which the 
Supreme Court has tried to define a liberty interest. 127 Although the 
117. Id at 356. 
118. Id Less than three years before Gibson's arrival at Trenton, the prison was so 
overcrowded that a conscious policy to reduce the prison population was foUowed by 
prison officials. Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. at 1228. Such a policy resulted in the 
creation of the Management Control Unit. See supra text accompanying notes 73-86. 
Prison administrators thus cannot make the claim that such a situation had never existed 
before and that deference should be given to the decisions they made in coping with 
Gibson's situation. 
119. 652 F.2d at 367 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
120. Id 
121. Id at 354. The Third Circuit previously had said it could not rely on these 
cases. Id IronicaUy, the court relied on the general principles enunciated in these cases 
to reach a decision in Gibson. 
122. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text. 
123. 418 U.S. at 557. 
124. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text. 
125. 427 U.S. 236 (1976). See infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text. 
126. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228; Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242-43. 
127. See generally Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. I (1979); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Perry v. 
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Third Circuit did not discuss the entire line of cases, it chose the 
three having the most significant bearing on the determination of the 
liberty interest. Cases in the line dealing with liberty interests that 
were not discussed by the court include Goldberg v. Kelly,128 Morris­
sey v. Brewer, 129 Board of Regents v. Roth, 130 and Perry v. 
Sindermann .131 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morris­
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. KeUy, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
128. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg was an action by "residents of New York City 
receiving financial aid under the federaUy assisted program of Aid to Families with De­
pendent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program." 
fd. at 255-56. Their complaint aUeged that ... officials administering these programs 
terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing, 
thereby denying them due process of law." fd. at 256. In holding that a pretermination 
evidentiary hearing must be held, the Court made no mention of having to look to state 
law to find a liberty interest, but instead looked to the impact upon the individual. fd. at 
266. 
129. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). "Petitioner Morrissey was convicted of false drawing or 
uttering of checks in 1967." fd. at 472. He was paroled in 1968 and seven months later 
he was arrested as directed by his parole officer because "he had violated ... [his] parole 
by buying a car under an assumed name and operating it without permission, giving false 
statements to police concerning his address and insurance company after a minor acci­
dent, obtaining credit under an assumed name, and failing to report his place of resi­
dence to his parole officer." fd. at 472-73. One week later the Parole Board revoked his 
parole and returned him to an institution about 100 miles from his home. fd. He "as­
sert[ed] he received no hearing prior to revocation of his parole." fd. at 473. 
Morrissey was concerned with whether the general requirements of due process ap­
plied to parole revocation. The Court noted that a parolee must rely on the implicit 
promise that parole revocation wi11 only occur if he fails to live up to the parole condi­
tions. fd. at 482. Termination of parole would inflict a "grievous loss" on the parolee 
and would upset society'S stake in restoring the parolee to a normal and useful life. fd. at 
482, 484. The Court required an informal hearing designed to assure that the finding of a 
parole violation would be based on verified facts and accurate knowledge of the parolee's 
behavior. fd. at 484. 
130. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth was hired as an assistant professor at a university 
for one academic year. fd. at 566. He completed the term and was informed he would 
not be rehired. fd. .He had no tenure right. fd. In Wisconson, a state university teacher 
could acquire tenure as a "permanent" employee only after four consecutive years of 
employment. fd. State law left the decision whether to rehire a nontenured teacher for 
another year to the unfettered discretion of university officials, and the rules established 
by the Board of Regents provided no real protection for the faculty members. The rules 
created by the Board of Regents "provid[ed] that a nontenured teacher 'dismissed' before 
the end of the year may have some opportunity for review" but there was no review 
process for a nontenured teacher who simply was not reemployed. fd. at 567. Roth 
aUeged, first, that the decision not to rehire him ''was to punish him for certain state­
ments critical of the university administration," and this violated his right to freedom of 
speech. fd. at 568. The second aUegation was that failure "to give ... notice of any 
reason for nonretention and an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to procedural 
due process of law." fd. at 569. 
131. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, a teacher in the state coUege system aUeged 
that the decision not to rehire him was due to his public criticism of administrative poli­
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In Goldberg, the Court asserted that "[t]he extent to which pro­
cedural due process must be afforded the [individual] is influenced 
by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss' 
. . . and depends upon whether the [individual's] interest in avoid­
ing that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adju­
dication."132 The Morrissey court stated that "[t]he question is not 
mer~ly the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the na­
ture of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or 
property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment."133 Although 
Roth addressed the issue of property interest, the case is relied upon 
in liberty interest decisions. 134 The Supreme Court stated that the 
"Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a 
safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already ac­
quired in specific benefits." 135 In order to have a property interest in 
a benefit, 
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire 
for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He 
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a 
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those 
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that 
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a pUIP,ose of the consti­
tutional right to a hearing to provide an opport~nity for a person 
to vindicate those claims. 136 
The Roth Court maintained "[p ]roperty interests . . . are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law-rules or understand­
ings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitle­
cies thus infringing upon his right to freedom of speech. Id at 595. Even though he had 
no contractual or tenure right he maintained that he and others relied on a provision in 
the official faculty guide which indicated that reemployment would occur. 
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of 
the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as 
long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooper­
ative attitude toward his coworkers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy 
in his work. 
Id at 600. 
132. 397 U.S. at 262-63. 
133. 408 U.S. at 481. 
134. The Supreme Court relied on Roth in its decision in Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U.S. at 224. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text. 
135. 408 U.S. at 576. 
136. Id at 577. 
265 1982) SOLITAR Y CONFINEMENT 
ment to those benefits." 137 This statement has been subject to varied 
interpretation. 
Subsequent cases have failed to recognize the phrase "such as" 
preceding "state law" and have interpreted the phrase to mean that 
property interests stem solely from state law.ns When properly di­
vided into its component parts, the sentence means that property in­
terests are created and defined by existing rules or understandings, a 
significant word largely ignored in the decisions, that stem from an 
independent source. State law was mentioned simply as one exam­
ple of an independent source. The Court concluded that petitioner 
Roth had no claim of entitlement nor was there any state statute, 
rule or policy that created any legitimate claim to reemployment. 139 
InPerry the Court examined the area of contract law that recog­
nizes implied agreements although there has been no formal written 
agreement. The Court recognized that "there may be an unwritten 
'common law' in a particular university ... that has no explicit ten­
ure system. . . but that nonetheless may have created such a system 
in practice."I40 
In Gibson, the Third Circuit interpreted WO!iF41 to mean that 
137. Id. 
138. See Sisbarro v. Warden, Mass. State Penitentiary, 592 F.2d I, 3 (1st Cir. 
1979); Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 356 (10th Cir. 1978); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 
364.376-77 (1st Cir. 1978); Russell v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 115, 117 (4th Cir. 1977). 
139. 408 U.S. at 578. 
140. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602. 
141. Wolf involved a Nebraska statute which provided that the chief executive 
officer of each penal facility was responsible for the discipline of the inmates. The statute 
also provided a range of possible disciplinary action. 418 U.S. at 545. 
Prison authorities, however, had established written regulations that dealt with pro­
cedures and policies for controlling inmate misconduct. Misconduct was classified into 
two categories: major misconduct, which was a "serious violation" and was to be for­
mally reported to an Adjustment Committee having a wide range of sanctions available 
to it; and minor misconduct, which was "a less serious violation" and could be resolved 
immediately with or without formal reporting. Id. at 548-52. The Court reasoned that 
deprivation of good time credit, although of considerable importance, was "qualitatively 
and quantitiatively different from the revocation of parole or probation." Id. at 561. 
"The deprivation of good time is not the same immediate disaster that the revocation of 
parole is for the parolee." Id. Good time can be restored and thus may not result in a 
postponement of parole eligibility and an extension of the term being served. Id. The 
State, therefore, had a different stake in the structure and content of the prison discipli­
nary hearing. Id. As prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecu­
tion, the full range of procedures suggested in Morrissey, see supra notes 129, 133 and 
accompanying text, were not necessary in order to satisfy the minimum requirements of 
procedural due process. "[A)dvance written notice cfthe c.laimed violation and a written 
statement of the fact finders as to the e"'idence relied upon and the reasons for the disci­
plinary action taken [must be provided)." Id. at 563. An "inmate. . . should be allowed 
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him 
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only state law is the source of a liberty interest. The court failed to 
recognize that Wo!lf also acknowledged that written regulations, 142 
which were framed by prison authorities and dealt with procedures 
and policies for controlling inmate misconduct, could support a lib­
erty interest. 143 Wo!lf was based on the existence of those regula­
tions. The state had created the right to good time l44 and the prison 
regulations illustrated that depriving a prisoner of good time was a 
sanction used for major misconduct. 145 The prisoner's interest, there­
fore, fell within the fourteenth amendment's liberty interest. 146 
The Supreme Court stated that its analysis paralleled the due 
process analysis used in property deprivation cases in which the 
Court consistently held that a hearing was required before a person 
may be deprived of his property. 147 The Court considered a person's 
liberty to be equally protected stating that "[t]he touchstone of due 
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 
govemment."148 The Gibson court completely ignored this statement 
from Wo!lf, relying instead upon two 1976 Supreme Court decisions, 
Meachum and Montanye, as the bases for its decision. 
Meachum and Montanye had a marked impact on the determi­
nation of prisoners' liberty interests. In both cases neither state law 
nor state practice existed which conditioned prison transfers on 
proof of serious misconduct or the occurrence of other events. 149 
to do so will not be unduly hazardous for institutional safety or correctional goals." Id 
at 566. There was no constitutional right to confrontation and cross examination or to 
appointed or retained counsel. Id at 567-70. 
The Court further stated that the procedural requirements mandated in situations 
where good time had been revoked also must be extended when solitary confinement is 
at issue. Id at 571 n.19. Solitary confinement "represents a major change in the condi­
tions- of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that 
there has been a major act of misconduct." Id 
142. 418 U.S. at 548. 
143. 652 F.2d at 354. 
144. The term of a committed offender could be reduced for "good behavior and 
faithful performance of duties while confined in a facility." 418 U.S. at 546 n.6. 
145. Id at 551 n.8. 
146. It! at 557. The Court stated that "the prisoner's interest has real substance 
and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to 
those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the 
Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." 
Id 
147. Id at 557-58. 
148. Id at 558. 
149. In Meachum, there had been a two and one-half month period in which nine 
serious fires occurred in the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, a me­
dium-security institution. 427 U.S. at 216. Six inmates were removed from the general 
population as a result of reports from informants and were placed in an administrative 
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The issue in these cases was whether the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment entitled a state prisoner to a hearing prior to 
being subjected to substantially less favorable conditions following a 
prison transfer. The transfers in Meachum resulted in a change from 
a medium security institution to a maximum security institution. 150 
In Montanye, however, the prisoner was transferred from one maxi­
mum security institution to another. 151 In neither case was there any 
deprivation upon arrival at the new institution. 152 
From the outset, the Court's discussion in Meachum indicated a 
narrowing of its previously expansive interpretation of a liberty in­
terest. The Court rejected "the notion that any grievous loss visited 
upon a person by the State [would] invoke the procedural protec­
tions of the Due Process Clause."153 The Court stated that there is 
no constitutional guarantee that a convicted prisoner will be placed 
into any particular prison. 154 A conviction extinguishes a prisoner's 
liberty interest in having the decision regarding prison assignment 
subjected to scrutiny under the due process clause. 155 "[T]o hold. . . 
that any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities trig­
gers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would 
subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions 
that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators 
rather than of the federal courtS."156 The Meachum court dis­
tinguished Wolff v. McDonnell 157 by stating that the liberty interest 
detention area used to process new inmates. Id Proceedings before the Norfolk Prison 
Classification Board were held regarding whether to transfer the inmates to another insti­
tution. Id at 216-17. Individual classification hearings were held in which each inmate 
had an attorney present. Id at 217. None of the inmates were given a copy of the 
transcript or summaries of testimony given in camera by the superintendent. The Board 
recommended that one inmate be placed in administrative segregation for 30 days; that 
three inmates be transferred to Walpole, a maximum-security institution; and two be 
transferred to Bridgewater, which had both maximum and medium-security facilities. 
Id at 218. 
In Montanye, an inmate was removed from his assignment as an inmate clerk in the 
law library at the Attica Correctional Facility. 427 U.S. at 238. A document was circu­
lated by the inmate complaining of deprivation of legal assistance. This document, 
which was signed by 82 inmates, was seized by prison officials. Id at 237-38. The next 
day the inmate was advised that he would be transferred to Clinton Correctional Facility 
which, like Attica, was a maximum-security institution. Id at 238. 
ISO. Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 218. 
lSI. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 238. 
152. Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 221-22; Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 238. 
153. Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 224 (emphasis in original). 
154. Id 
ISS. Id 
156. Id at 225 (emphasis in original). 
157. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. 
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protected in Wolff was rooted in state law but in Meachum there was 
no liberty interest under Massachusetts law for a prisoner to remain 
at the prison where he initially was assign~d: 158 "Holding that ar­
rangements like this are within reach of the procedural protections of 
the Due Process Clause would place the Clause astride the day-to­
day functioning of state prisons and involve the judiciary in issues 
and discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal 
judges."159 Montanye adopted Meachum's holding and added that 
"[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the 
prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is 
not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause 
does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities 
to judicial oversight."160 . 
In Gibson, the Third Circuit rejected the district court's finding 
of a policy and practice creating a liberty interest in a prisoner's con­
ditions or degree of confinement.161 The finding was first rejected 
because Meachum and Montanye provided that "deprivations and 
loss of privileges, even in combination cannot create a state expecta­
tion or liberty interest."162 Second, the finding was rejected because 
the policy or practice which Gibson asserted was never estab­
lished. 163 The court gave undue weight to Meachum and Montanye. 
Both of those cases dealt with prisoner transfers due to disciplinary 
infractions. There, the inmates were not subject to disciplinary pun­
ishment upon arrival at the transfer prison. 
In Meachum, the Court specifically limited its holding to Massa­
chusetts and stated that other states were free to develop their own 
transfer policies.l64 Meachum has been viewed as providing a hard 
158. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 226. 
159. Id at 228-29. 
160. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 242. 
161. 652 F.2d at 357. 
162. Id 
163. Id The policy or practice of the institution was that after a short period of 
orientation, prisoners were afforded all of the privileges of the general population, that 
only risk inmates had privileges restricted, and that in all cases of restrictions hearings 
were afforded. Id The court pointed to New Jersey's arguments that other inmates were 
in the same position as Gibson and that "there had never previously existed a cell 
shortage of such magnitude in the prison system which could have fostered the beginning 
of any history of 'policies and practices as alleged.''' Id 
164. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 228-29. 

A prisoner's behavior may precipitate a transfer, and absent such behavior, per­

haps transfer would not take place at all. But, as we have said, Massachusetts 

prison officials have the discretion to transfer prisoners for any number of rea­

sons. Their discretion is not limited to instances of serious misconduct. . . . 

The individual States, of course, are free to follow another course, whether by 
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and fast rule that although a prison transfer would have a substan­
tially adverse impact on the prisoner, the resultant conditions of con­
finement would not invoke fourteenth amendment protection. Such 
an approach effectively prevents decisions on the merits of certain 
cases. The court failed to consider the broader implications of its 
limited view of a constitutionally protected liberty: "[I]f followed to 
its extreme, [this view] would allow the state to pass a law granting 
some benefit while explicitly disapproving the extension of proce­
dural protections when a benefit [was] deprived."165 
In Hodges v. Klein 166 the district court briefly touched upon the 
issue of a hearing before prisoner transfer by noting that 
[a]1though the expectation of remaining at a particular prison or in 
a particular part of a prison unless found guilty of misconduct is 
'too ephemeral and insubstantial' an expectation to require due 
process protection ... it could be said that the New Jersey prison 
complex (like others), through its policies and practices ... has 
created a justifiable expectation that an inmate would not be 
placed in solitary confinement or conditions similar to it absent 
proof of misconduct or the occurrence of certain events. 167 
Hodges, however, did not pursue the issue because Management 
Control Unit (MCU)168 inmates were provided hearings and peri­
odic review. 169 The Third Circuit in Gibson did not address this 
statement by the Hodges court. 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of The Nebraska Penal and Correctional 
Complex 170 was a class action suit alleging that N"ebraska's statutes 
and the parole board's procedures denied due process: 171 "The pro­
cedures used by the Board to determine whether to grant or deny 
discretionary parole arise partly from statutory provisions and partly 
statute, by rule or regulation, or by interpretation of their own constitutions. 
They may thus decide that prudent prison administration requires pretransfer 
hearings. Our holding is that the Due Process Clause does not impose a nation­
wide rule mandating transfer hearings. 
Id 
165. Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Meachum v. 
Fano, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 405, 416 (1977). 
166. 421 F. Supp. 1224 (D.N.J. 1976), affd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977). 
167. Id at 1232 n.12. 
168. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text. 
169. 421 F. Supp. at 1232 n.12. 
170. 442 U.S. I (1979). 
171. The statutes provided for both mandatory and discretionary parole. Parole 
was automatic when an inmate had served his maximum term, less good-time credits. 
NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,107(1)(b) (1981). Parole was discretionary when the minimum 
term, less good time credits, had been served. Id § 83-1,110(1). See 442 U.S. at 4. 
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from the Board's practices."172 The district court held that the in­
mates had the same constitutionally protected "conditional liberty" 
interest recognized in Morrissey v. Brewer l73 and that some of the 
board's procedures fell short of constitutional guarantees. 174 The 
Supreme Court stated that there was a crucial distinction between 
being deprived of a liberty one may have in parole, and being denied 
a conditional liberty that one desires.17S ''That the state holds out 
thepossibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the 
benefit will be obtained. . . . [T]he general interest asserted here is 
no more substantial than the inmate's hope that he will not be trans­
ferred to another prison ...."176 
The argument that the language of the statute177 created a pro­
tected expectation of parole was rejected by the Court which noted 
that "[m]erely because a statutory expectation exists cannot mean 
that in addition to the full panoply of due process required to convict 
and confine there must also be repeated, adversary hearings in order 
to continue the confinement."178 The Court decided that the proce­
dures already in existence were adequate because to require more 
would tum the process into an adversarial proceeding and experi­
ence had shown that the parole release decision was "essentially an 
172. 442 U.S. at 4. Hearings were conducted in two stages to determine whether to 
grant or deny parole: initial review hearings (held at least once a year for every inmate) 
and final parole hearings. If the Board determined the inmate was not a good risk then 
parole was deferred. If the Board determined the inmate was a likely candidate then a 
final hearing was scheduled. If parole was denied, the Board furnished a written state­
ment of the reasons. 1d at 4-5. 
173. See supra notes 129, 133 and accompanying text. 
174. 442 U.S. at 5. 
175. Id at 9. 
176. Id at 11 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
177. The section relied on provided in pan: 
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed of­
fender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is 
of the opinion that his release should be deferred because: 
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions 
of parole; 
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote 
disrespect for law; 
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional 
discipline; or 
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or 
other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a 
law-abiding life when released at a later date. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114(1) 
(1976). 
442 U.S. at II. 
178. 442 U.S. at 14. 
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experienced prediction based on a host of variables."I79 
Greenholtz disregards Roth,ISO Perry,ISI and WO!if}S2 The 
Court previously had said that the source of a liberty interest came 
from state law. IS3 In Greenholtz, however, the Court noted that even 
if a state law existed there might be only the possibility of finding a 
liberty interest and a mere hope that the benefit would be obtained 
once that interest was found. ls4 
Rhodes v. Chapman,IS5 is the most recent case in the line oflib­
erty interest cases. In Rhodes, the Supreme Court held that double 
celling of inmates did not violate either the eighth or fourteenth 
amendments. The Supreme Court initially considered a liberty in­
terest as an expansive right derived from a relationship between the 
individual and the state. A balancing of interests determined 
whether the individual loss outweighed the governmental interest. 
Some type of hearing, although not a formal adversarial procedure, 
was required prior to deprivation. The Court contended that claims 
upon which people relied in their daily lives should be protected. IS6 
The parameters of those claims gained definition from existing rules 
or understandings}S7 A further expansion resulted when the Court 
in Perry, recognized that policies and practices could be developed 
and some degree of reliance and expectation eventually would be 
associated with those practices. ISS In Wo!if, prison regulations were 
recognized by the Court as a source from which a liberty interest 
could be derived. 1S9 
The Court, in Meachum, retreated from this gradual expansion 
and narrowed its previous interpretation of the sources of a liberty 
interest and concluded that state law was the only source from which 
a liberty interest could be derived. 190 The Court further narrowed 
potential sources by stating in Greenholtz that even if a state law 
existed there might be only a slight possibility of finding a liberty 
179. Id at 14-15. 
180. See supra notes 130, 134-39 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra notes 131, 140 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. 
183. See supra notes 149-65 and accompanying text. 
184. 442 U.S. at II. 
185. 432 U.S. 337 (1981); see supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text. 
186. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
187. 408 U.S. at 577; "See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
188. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602; see supra notes 131, 140 and accompanying text. 
189. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 548, 557; see supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. 
190. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226; see supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text. 
• • • • 
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interest and merely a hope that the benefit would be obtained. 191 
The Court's recent decision in Rhodes determined that prisons which 
house inmates convicted of serious crimes need not be free of dis­
comfort, indicating that it would be difficult to find a liberty interest 
in prison situations. l92 
B. State Created Liberty Interest 
After looking to United States Supreme Court cases, the Gibson 
court looked to New Jersey's statutes to determine whether a liberty 
interest could be found. The court noted that under the relevant 
statute, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections was 
given "broad and discretionary power over those persons who [were] 
committed to the State's institutions." 193 The Commissioner also was 
granted the power to administer the work of the Department of Cor­
rections: 194 to issue rules and regulations; 195 to transfer inmates 
from one institution to another; 196 and to designate places of confine­
ment. 197 These sections refer to transfers "more appropriate for his 
191. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at II; see supra notes 170-83 and accompanying text. 
192. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349; see supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text. 
193. 652 F.2d 348, 355 (3d Cir. 1981). The statute states that: 
the purpose of the department shall be to ... provide for the custody, care, 
discipline, training and treatment of persons committed to State correctional 
institutions. . . to supervise and assist in the treatment and training of persons 
in local correctional and detention facilities, so that such persons may be pre­
pared for release and reintegration into the Community .... 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:IB-3 (West 1981). 
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:IB-6. The statute, in pertinent part states: 
The commissioner, as administrator and chief executive officer of the depart­
ment, shall: 
a. Administer the work of the department; 
e. Formulate, adopt, issue and promulgate, in the name of the depart­
ment such rules and regulations for the efficient conduct of the work and gen­
eral administration of the department. . . 
f. Determine all matters relating to the unified and continuous develop­
ment of the institutions and noninstitutional agencies within his jurisdiction; 
g. Determine all matters of policy and regulate the administration of the 
institutions or noninstitutional agencies within his jurisdiction, correct and ad­




196. Id. § 30:4-85. The provision states: "Any inmate of any correctional institu­
tion . . . may be transferred to any other such correctional institution by order of the 
commissioner directing such transfer, either upon the application of the chief executive 
officer or upon the initiative of the commissioner ...." Id. 
197. Id. § 30:4-91.1. 
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needs and welfare or that of other inmates or for the security of the 
institution."198 The Gibson dissent noted that the Commissioner's 
discretion was restricted both by statute and by the requirement that 
any exercise of discretion must not be arbitrary.199 The dissent 
agreed with the majority that New Jersey, by statute, had expressly 
given the Commissioner sole discretion to transfer inmates. It noted, 
however, that the majority failed to point to any statutory provisions 
authorizing the suspension of inmate rights at the Commissioner's 
discretion.2°O 
The New Jersey legislature determined that "[t]here is a need to 
... [p]rovide maximum-security confinement of those offenders 
whose demonstrated propensity to acts of violence requires their sep­
aration from the community ... [and that] [t]he environment for 
incarcerated persons should encourage the possibilities of rehabilita­
tion and reintegration into the community ...."201 
The court referred to Rocca v. Groomes,202 in which two classifi­
cation committees had recommended that a prisoner who had com­
mitted a disciplinary infraction203 be transferred to a maximum 
security institution. The court held that the transfer did not result in 
any denial of due process although it was accomplished without a 
prior hearing, reasoning that an individual is sentenced to the state 
prison and not to a particular component of it.204 Thus, an inmate 
has no statutory right to remain in any particular institution since 
prison officials have the broad discretion to transfer an inmate from 
When a person has been convicted ofan offense against the State of New Jersey 
and has been committed for a term of imprisonment by a court to an institution 
. . . and when it appears to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Institutions 
and Agencies that the inmate should be transferred to an institution or facility 
more appropriate for his needs and welfare or that of other inmates or for the 
security of the institution, the commissioner shall be authorized and empow­
ered to designate the place of confinement to which the inmate shall be trans­
ferred to serve his sentence. 
Id. § 30:4-91.1. 
198. Id. § 30:4-91.1 (West 1981). 
199. 652 F.2d at 366 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
200. Id. at 367. 
201. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:IB-3 (West 1981). 
202. 144 N.J. Super. 213, 365 A.2d 195 (App. Div. 1976). 
203. 652 F.2d at 355 n.8. An inmate at New Jersey State Prison at Leesburg was 
found guilty of a disciplinary infraction after a hearing before the Adjustment Commit­
tee and was subjected to a penalty of 15 days "lock up" in the readjustment unit and the 
loss of 30 days commutation credits. Upon the recommendation of the Classification 
Committee and approval by the Inter-Institutional Classification Committee he was 
transferred to Trenton State Prison. 144 N.J. Super. at 214-15, 365 A.2d at 196. 
204. Id. 
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one institution to another.20s 
The Gibson dissent argued that the state created right need not 
be embodied in a statute206 and examined Winsett v. MpGinnes,207 a 
Third Circuit decision, as relevant to Gibson's situation. Winsett 
was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for felony murder 
of a Delaware state police officer.20s After serving ten years as a 
model prisoner he requested work release certification.209 His appli­
cation was approved by two of the three requisite levels of deci­
sionmakers but, before the superintendent could give his approval, 
public opposition began to mount.210 Winsett's application subse­
quently was rejected. Winsett then filed a civil rights action alleging 
that the superintendent's consideration of public opinion was an im­
permissible basis for evaluation of such applications. 2I I 
Winsett's claim of a liberty interest was grounded in the regula­
tions issued by the Department of Corrections, promulgated by the 
department to implement the basic legislative grant of authority to 
create a work release program.212 The Third Circuit found that a 
"state-created liberty interest in work release arises when a prisoner 
meets all eligibility requirements under the state regulations and the 
exercise of the prison authorities' discretion is consistent with work 
release policy."213 The Third Circuit did not review the prison au­
thorities' discretion as absolute, and therefore such discretion did not 
negate the existence of the state created entitlement.214 
The Gibson majority, however, concluded that the Commis­
sioner's rules and regulations concerning the use of solitary confine­
ment dealt only with disciplinary detention, protective custody 
detention, and administrative segregation, and did not limit the use 
of segregated housing for housing holds.2ls A provision of the New 
Jersey statutes provides that "[a]ny person transferred ... shall be 
held in the custody of the institution to which transfer is made, sub­
ject to the rules and regulations thereof and the provisions of law 
applicable thereto as though originally committed to such institu­
205. Id at 215, 365 A.2d at 199. 
206. 652 F.2d at 363 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
207. 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980), cerro denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981). 
208. Id at 999. 
209. Id 
210. Id at 1000. 
211. Id at 998. 
212. Id at 1005. 
213. Id at 1007. 
214. Id at 1006. 
215. 652 F.2d at 355. 
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tion."216 A further provision specifies that 
every State penal and correctional institution shall formally pro­
mulgate and publish rules and regulations governing the rights, 
privileges, duties and obligations of the inmate population [and] 
. . . detail the procedures for imposing summary and administra­
tive punishment as well as for appealing therefrom. No punish­
ment may be meted out other than of the type and in the manner 
prescribed by such rules and regulations .... Upon the arrival 
of a prisoner ... he shall be furnished with a copy of the institu­
tion's rules and regulations and shall have the meaning of the 
same explained to him.217 
Gibson was sent to Yardville on January 25, 1977. On Febru­
ary 8, 1977, he was classified for Rahway. On February 18, 1977, the 
addendum to the Trenton State Prison Inmate Handbook was pub­
lished providing that "administrative quarantine at State Prison, 
Trenton is to be used for the. . . housing of. . . Prison Reception 
Unit housing holds assigned by Inter-Institution Classification Com­
mittee for assignment to State Prison, Rahway or State Prison, Lees­
burg."21s The Inter-Institution Classification Committee is 
comprised of the Superintendents of Trenton, Rahway and Leesburg 
State Prison or their designates.219 Before the addendum was added 
to the handbook, solitary confinement was restricted to two catego­
ries of individuals: The first category was for inmates requiring spe­
cial detention as a means of discipline; the second category, called 
administrative segregation, applied to inmates in need of protective 
custody or who continued to violate the institution's rules or regula­
tions or who posed a continued serious threat to the inmate's safety 
and security.220 
Apparently, the superintendents of the respective institutions 
met, noted the existence of a cell shortage, and, in response, created 
the new classification of administrative quarantine. Because the 
description of administrative quarantine does not mention that hous­
ing holds would be inmates who were disciplinary problems or in 
need of protective custody, it is perplexing why the description in­
216. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-86 (West 1981). 
217. Id. § 30:4-8.4, 5. 
218. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 33a, supra note 16. 
219. 652 F.2d at 356 n.lO. 
220. Id. at 367 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Detention requires a due process 
hearing and is limited to a maximum period of 30 days. Id. A due process hearing is 
also required before administrative segregation can be imposed and confinement can last 
as long as the inmate demonstrates an inability to get along. Id. 
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cluded a list of sanctions to which the housing holds would be sub­
jected. The sanctions proscribe contact visitation rights and yard 
recreation rights. Inmates so confined would not be processed 
through the Classification Committee for custody or program assign­
ments.221 The district court and the Third Circuit dissent believed 
that administrative quarantine was meant to expand the category of 
prisoners who could be isolated and was not meant to deprive these 
inmates of the rights afforded to every other isolated prisoner.222 
The Third Circuit specifically rejected the arguments of Gibson 
and the district court that New Jersey's disciplinary regulations were 
the source of Gibson's liberty interest,223 Gibson contended that be­
cause a prisoner who had been segregated for disciplinary reasons 
must be afforded a hearing and periodic review of his confinement in 
isolation, a fortiori, a prisoner such as Gibson who had committed 
no infraction, should, at the least, be entitled to the same procedure 
before being subjected to the same conditions.224 The court, how­
ever, stated that the only standards and regulations of New Jersey 
limiting the authority and discretion of prison officials were found in 
the context of disciplinary, protective custody, and severe risk 
cases.225 Prisoners, in those cases, could claim a substantive right not 
to be so confined without due process protections. The court further 
reasoned that Gibson did not fall into any of these categories be­
cause he was segregated solely as a result of the cell shortage and 
because he was not the type of prisoner who properly would be clas­
sified for general population at Trenton.226 Gibson, therefore, had 
no substantive right that was entitled to due process protection. 
Administrative quarantine had been created to alleviate the 
overcrowding, thus, Gibson did not fall within any of the previously 
stated categories. The claim that Gibson was not the type of pris­
oner for general population at Trenton was an indication that prison 
officials wanted to protect him from the inmates at Trenton who 
were there because they had committed serious offenses. Superin­
tendent Hilton testified that although the Leesburg prisoners were 
"minimum" custody status, he was not concemed.227 Some of these 
Leesburg prisoners were transferred to general population in Tren­
221. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 34a, supra note 16. 
222. 652 F.2d at 368 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 




227. Trial Transcript at 11-12, supra note 70. 
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ton.228 The court's reasoning is far from clear in explaining why an 
inmate who does not fit within a particular defined category, yet 
whose treatment in effect is the same as those who do fit withln that 
category, should be denied the same procedural protections. If Gib­
son had committed an infraction, he would have been entitled to a 
due process hearing after which the maximum period of solitary con­
finement was thirty days.229 In deciding that the Commissioner's 
discretion is limited only by regulations which specifically state the 
prisoner has a right to due process protections, the Third Circuit, in 
effect, gave prison administrators the authority to determine under 
what circumstances a substantive right will exist. 
IV. RIGHT TO A HEARING 
The Third Circuit stated that disciplinary hearings were held to 
determine if the prisoner breached a prison rule. In Gibson's case, 
however, there was no basis upon which to hold a hearing.23o The 
court stated that Gibson's complaint did not pertain to the fact that 
he did not receive a hearing but that he was kept in solitary confine­
menU3l Even if he were to have received a hearing, he would have 
been dissatisfied. The court concluded that a hearing at this point 
would have consisted of no more than a statement to Gibson that he 
was being held in quarantine because of a shortage of cell space in 
general population.232 
A hearing in this situation should be more than simply the obvi­
ous statement that the inmate was being kept in quarantine. It 
should consist of a brief explanation of the situation, how long 
prison officials thought the situation would continue, and what the 
inmate could expect during his confinement under quarantine condi­
tions. Assurances that the inmate would be removed from quaran­
tine as soon as a cell became available might also be given. A 
hearing would serve the important administrative functions of creat­
ing a record, providing official notification, and putting prison offi­
cials on notice that a prisoner was being held in solitary confinement 
pending a transfer to the assigned institution. 
The dissent argued that "[e]xperience has shown that when ad­
ministrators are required to document the reasons for their decisions 
228. Id at 191. 
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the constitutional and statutory rights of persons affected by those 
decisions receive greater consideration and protection. It is this 
value which is lost when the right to due process is abrogated."233 
In Smoake v. Fritz ,234 the State of New York argued that pris­
oners who had been placed in segregated quarters were being kept in 
"administrative segregation" rather than solitary confinement or pu­
nitive segregation.235 The court concluded that the distinction was 
largely semantic: each was in his cell twenty-three hours per day, 
there was no mingling with the general population or participation 
in normal prison activities.236 Access to the mess hall was denied, 
inmates wore the same clothing for seven days, showers were pro­
vided once a week, and there was no hot water supplied.237 These 
arguments are applicable to Gibson's situation for he was subjected 
to similar treatment and similar rationalizations were advanced by 
prison officials. 
In King v. Higgins,238 the court stated that it was no answer to 
the failure to provide notice prior to the hearing that "King knew 
why he had been placed in the 'Awaiting Action' cell."239 The pris­
oner was entitled to due process "whether the decision affecting his 
status was based on security, rehabilitation, or punishment."240 
The Gibson dissent also argued that Gibson did not differ from 
a prisoner in the segregation category241 because the prison officials 
stated they had placed him in administrative quarantine because he . 
was not the type of prisoner who would properly be classified for 
general population.242 Judge Higginbotham inquired, "Is the right 
to due process so fragile that it can be lost by a sleight of hand that 
233. Id at 369 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
234. 320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
235. Id at 610. 
236. Id 
237. Id 
238. 370 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Mass. 1974). 
239. Id at 1028. 
240. Id at 1029. 

While the prisoner may be charged with knowledge of facts and circumstances 

of a particular event, he cannot be charged with knowledge as to the legal inter­

pretation or theory of action which prison authorities may seek to follow with 
respect to such event. The situation is analogous to that involving an individual 
who knows the circumstances which brought about his arrest, but is nonetheless 
entitled to notice as to the theory of action the government intends to pursue 
with respect to his case. 
Id at 1028. 
241. 652 F.2d at 368 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). A prisoner is put in segrega­
tion because of an inability to get along in the general population. Id 
242. Id 
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alters form but leaves substance untouched? I cannot believe that 
such a drastic change in constitutional protection can be effected by 
the mere expedient of a name change."243 
V. CONCLUSION 
Gibson v. Lynch244 is representative of a developing trend to 
narrow prisoners' rights. A number of Supreme Court decisions 
have provided an impetus to lower courts dealing with questions of 
prisoners' rights. The Court initially placed emphasis on the indi­
vidual loss in a given circumstance and balanced individual and 
governmental interests. Claims relied upon by people in their daily 
lives were to be protected. The Court eventually recognized that 
policies and practices could develop upon which some degree of reli­
ance and expectation would become associated. 
The Court's decision in Meachum v. Fano 24S marked the begin­
ning of its withdrawal from this expansive line of decisions. 
Meachum heralded another equally expansive line of decisions 
which contorted the earlier pronouncements into unrecognizable 
vestiges. Meachum has been interpreted to mean that if the state has 
not provided a liberty interest to the prisoner in any of its laws, then 
the prisoner cannot find such an interest elsewhere. 
The case was not intended to establish a nationwide rule in 
transfer situations, but such a rule has evolved. There were no dep­
rivations imposed upon the Meachum transferees after their transfer 
to the receiving institution. The decision has been held determina­
tive in transfer situations which resulted in the imposition of depri­
vations at the receiving institution. Unlike the situation in Gibson, 
the transfers in other cases were the result of rule violations by the 
transferred inmates. The transfer thus becomes somewhat more jus­
tifiable in those cases due to issues of prison security. Most dis­
turbing is the judiciary's willingness to close its eyes to these' 
disparities and apply Meachum as a standard applicable to all situa­
tions in which a prisoner is moved from one institution to another, 
irrespective of the motivations behind the move. 
The consequences of these decisions are that federal courts 
should not interfere in prison administration; state law has become 
the source of a liberty interest; prison administrators are to be ac­
corded wide-ranging deference; prisoners can be transferred from 
243. ld 
244. 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981). 
245. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). 
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one institution to another and subjected to adverse conditions where 
exigent circumstances exist and the security of the institution is pro­
moted; and preliminary hearings are not necessary where the pris­
oner "knows" the reasons for his treatment. 
The Gibson court, like other courts, misinterpreted Meachum. It 
failed to look to its own decision in Winsett. The court looked in­
stead for an explicit statement in the very recently written and 
adopted Addendum which would grant housing holds the right to a 
hearing and would limit the length of time spent in solitary confine­
ment. Finding no such statement, the court decided it could reach 
no other conclusion than that Gibson had no liberty interest. Gibson 
is a result-oriented decision that effectively denies prisoners any re­
covery from such arbitrary treatment. 
Theresa A. St. Helaire 
